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JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)0).STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Issue No. 1: Did the district court properly conclude that Appellees Lynn, Luann
and Eric Coon (collectively referred to as "Coon Defendants") owed no duty to Plaintiff
to protect him from harm by a third party with whom they had no special relationship?
Standard of Review: An appellate court reviews a trial court's grant of summary
judgment for correctness, affording no special deference to the trial court's legal
conclusions. Girbick v. Numed, Inc., 977 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1999). The reviewing court
may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground available to the trial court, even
if it is one not relied upon below. See Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah
1993).
GOVERNING LAW
There are no determinative statutes or constitutional provisions at issue in this
case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

Appellant Larry Henshaw was injured when he was hit by a four-wheel all terrain
vehicle ("ATV") owned by Lynn and Luann Coon but driven without their knowledge by
their son Eric's adult friend, Dallon Walters. Henshaw filed suit against several
l

individuals and entities, including the Coon Defendants, claiming they were liable for his
injuries. Following discovery, the Coon Defendants moved for summary judgment
arguing they had no duty to protect Henshaw from Walters1 wrongful conduct. The
district court agreed and, after briefing and oral argument, entered summary judgment in
the Coon Defendants' favor. Henshaw appeals that ruling.
B.

Statement of Facts.

Lynn and Luann Coon are the parents of Eric Coon, who was nineteen years old at
the time of the incident. (R. at 232, 433.) On May 29, 1999, Eric invited several friends
to his grandmother's cabin. (R. at 233.) There is nothing in the record establishing Lynn
or Luann knew alcohol would be present at the cabin or that Eric had past parties there
involving alcohol. Eric did not bring any alcohol to the cabin. (R. at 431.)
Eric did not invite Dallon Walters to the party. However, he came with a friend of
Eric's who had been invited. (R. at 233, 434, 585.) Walters was 18 years old and brought
18 cans of beer. (R. at 432.) From the time he arrived at about 6:30 p.m. until midnight,
Walters consumed between 3-5 beers and a shot of liquor. (R. at 431-433.) The accident
occurred at about 1:30 a.m. {Id.)
Lynn and Luann stored an ATV they owned in the basement of the cabin. (R. at
434.) Unbeknownst to Lynn and Luann, and without their permission, some of Eric's
friends removed the ATV from the basement and rode it while it was still light. (R. at
434-35.) Once it grew dark, Eric specifically told his friends not to ride the ATV because
the headlight was broken. (R. at 434-35.) Eric made sure before he went to sleep that the
2

ATV was parked and not being used. (R. at 435.) However, Walters snuck it out while
Eric was asleep and, during his ride, hit Plaintiff. (R. at 233, 435.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Henshaw was injured when Dallon Walters hit him while driving the ATV without
permission in the dark without a headlight while drunk. Henshaw seeks to impose
liability on the Coon Defendants arguing they were negligent in failing to prevent Walters
from injuring him. The Coon Defendants did not have a duty to protect Henshaw from
Walters. They did not cause the injury and none of them had a special relationship with
either Henshaw or Walters sufficient to impose a duty. Even if they did, they were not
the cause of Henshaw's injuries. Moreover, it was not reasonably foreseeable that
Walters would negligently operate the ATV and cause harm to Henshaw. Therefore,
summary judgment in favor of the Coon defendants was appropriate and should be
affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COON DEFENDANTS OWED NO DUTY TO HENSHAW TO
PROTECT HIM FROM HARM BY WALTERS

Henshaw alleged in his complaint that the Coon Defendants were negligent in
failing to prevent Walters from injuring him. "In order to recover under a negligence
claim, a plaintiff must establish that 'the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty

'"

Drysdale v. Rogers, 869 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Lamarr v. Utah State
Dep't of Tramp., 828 P.2d 535, 537 (Utah App. 1992)). Absent a showing of duty, a
3

plaintiff cannot recover. Id. (citing Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156, 1159 (Utah 1991);
Lamarr, 828 P.2d at 537-38).
The law in Utah is well-established that "a person has no affirmative duty to
control the conduct of another, to protect another from harm, or to render aid to someone
already injured through no act or fault of the person." Gilger v. Hernandez, 200 UT 23,
lj 15, 997 P.2d 305 (citing Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993);
Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1986)). Under this general rule,
Henshaw's claims against the Coon Defendants necessarily fail as a matter of law for lack
of duty without further analysis because the Coon Defendants did not injure Henshaw;
Walters, who was 18 at the time, was the one who hit him. There is a narrow exception to
the general rule where the person upon whom a duty is sought to be imposed has a
"special relationship" with either the person causing the harm or the injured person. Id. at
% 15 (citing Higgins, 855 P.2d at 236; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1964)).
'The 'essence' of a special relationship creating the duty to protect or aid another is
'dependency by one party upon the other or mutual dependence between the parties.'" Id.
(citing Beach, 726 P.2d at 416, RESTATEMENT § 314A cmt. b) (emphases added).

4

A.

There Is No Special Relationship Requiring Lynn or Luann to
Protect Henshaw From Walters.

Henshaw claims Lynn and Luann had a duty to protect him from Walters. The
Utah Court of Appeals declined to find such a special relationship in Drysdale v. Rogers,
869 P.2d 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), under facts remarkably similar to those involved here.
The plaintiff in Drysdale was a passenger in a car driven by the defendants' 19-year-old
son. He was injured when the son, who had been drinking that night, hit a tree. Id. at 1-2.
The plaintiff filed suit against the parents claiming they were negligent in leaving their
son alone at home where alcohol was present, knowing he had previously used drugs and
alcohol in direct disregard of their orders. Id. at 2. The parents filed a motion for
summary judgment arguing they owed no duty of care to the plaintiff and, therefore,
could not be held liable for his injuries. The trial court granted the motion and the
plaintiff appealed. Id.
This Court affirmed. It explained, "c[I]n determining the existence of the duty, we
examine such factors as the identity and character of the actor, the victim, and the
victimizer, the relationship of the actor to the victim and the victimizer, and the practical
impact that finding a special relationship would have.'" Drysdale, 869 P.2d at 3 (quoting
Higgins, 855 P.2d at 237). It declined to find the parents had a special relationship with
the plaintiff in that case because:

5

1.

Their son was an adult when he injured the plaintiff;

2.

Knowing of his past, they forbade their son to have any friends over while
they were gone or to drink;

3.

Imposition of a duty on parents to control an adult child was
unprecedented;

4.

The parents took no affirmative actions that led to the plaintiffs injuries;

5.

The accident was not reasonably foreseeable.

Id. at 3-4.
The facts in this case are even more compelling against finding a special
relationship than in Drysdale. Lynn and Luann's son, Eric, was, like the son in Drysdale,
an adult at the time of the accident. Knowing of prior parties at their house involving
alcohol, the parents in Drysdale specifically forbade their son from drinking while they
were gone. Here, there is nothing in the record establishing Lynn or Luann knew about
prior drinking at the cabin by Eric and his friends and Eric did not himself bring any
alcohol to the cabin. The party in Drysdale took place at the parents' house. Here, the
party took place at a cabin not even owned by Lynn or Luann. The tortfeasor in Drysdale
was the parents' son. Here, it was not Lynn and Luann's son; it was Walters with whom
Lynn and Luann had no relationship and no idea he would be at the cabin. They did not
do anything affirmative to cause the accident. Moreover, it was not reasonably
foreseeable that Walters would drive the ATV drunk in the dark without a functioning
headlight, particularly where family rules dictated no one was to operate the ATV past
dark, as evidenced by Eric's instructions to his friends. Finally, there are no facts in the
6

record establishing the very '''essence' of a special relationship creating the duty to
protect or aid another . . . ." Gilger v. Hernandez, 200 UT 23 at ^ 15 (citing Beach. 726
P.2d at 416, Restatement § 314A cmt. b) (emphases added). That is "dependency by one
party upon the other . . .." Id. There is nothing showing either Henshaw or Walters were
dependent upon Lynn or Luann for protection.
Henshaw cites White v. Pinney, 108 P.2d 249, in support of his argument that Lynn
and Luann had a duty, as owners of the ATV, to either fix the broken headlight or disable
the ATV so it could not be driven. Henshaw fails, however, to explain how White
applies. White is inapplicable here. It involved the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Res ipsa
applies only:
when a thing which causes injury is shown to be under the exclusive control of the
defendant, and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of things does not occur
if the one having such control uses proper care the happening of the accident is
evidence sufficient to justify or sustain an inference that defendant did not exercise
due and proper care.
Id. at 251. Lynn and Luann did not have exclusive control of the ATV. Walters took it
from the cabin without their knowledge and drove it negligently. It was that intervening
act which caused the accident, not the broken headlight. Therefore, res ipsa does not
apply to infer any negligence by Lynn or Luann.
Even if it did, Henshaw's claims against them still fail. The Utah Supreme Court
has ruled:

Res ipsa loquitur . . . has no bearing on the issue of causation, which must be
separately and independently established . . . Res ipsa loquitur does not relieve
plaintiff of [the obligation of proving causation]; rather, it permits him, in lieu of
linking his injury to a specific act on defendant's part, to causally connect it with
an agency or instrumentality, under the exclusive control of the defendant,
functioning in a manner which, under the circumstances, would produce no injury
absent [that defendant's] negligence.
Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional Medical Ctr., 791 P.2d 193, 196 (Utah 1990) (alterations
in original) (footnote omitted). It explained:
A plaintiff may prove causation [through res ipsa] by showing "that the
defendant was responsible for all reasonably probable causes to which the
accident could be attributed."
Id. at 197. The undisputed material facts establish Walters was the cause of the accident.
His decision to drive the ATV in the dark while drunk without a working headlight
triggered the accident. As stated aptly by the district court, "It was not reasonably
foreseeable that a guest at a party hosted by Eric Coon would negligently operate the
ATV at night without a workable headlight." (R. at 829.) Therefore, Henshaw cannot
prove causation even if White applied and summary judgment in Lynn and Luann's favor
was still appropriate.
Henshaw mentions in passing but fails to establish that the rules of Pine Mountain
Mutual Water Association ("PMMWA") may have imposed a duty on Lynn and Luann to
fix or disable the ATV. The facts in the record prove the rules and regulations do not
apply to Lynn and Luann. Lynn and Luann are not members of PMMWA. (R. at 233324, 829.) They do not own property covered by PMMWA. {Id.) Therefore, they are not
bound by PMMWA's rules and regulations. Consequently, the rules and regulations
8

cannot form the basis of a duty by Lynn or Luann.
Henshaw has failed to establish that Lynn or Luann owed any duty to protect him
from harm by Walters. Therefore, there is no basis for imposition of liability against
them and the Court should affirm summary judgment in their favor.
B.

There Is No Special Relationship Requiring Eric to Protect Henshaw
From Walters.

Henshaw claims Eric Coon had a duty to protect him from Walters because he was
the host of the party Walters was attending. It is undisputed that Walters was not invited
to the cabin. (R. at 233.) Therefore, he was not Eric's guest. Even if he were, the Utah
Supreme Court expressly held in Gilger that "no special relationship exists between a host
and a guest that imposes on a social host a duty either to control one guest or to protect
another when one threatens to injure the other." Gilger, 2000 UT 23 at ^f 17. The court's
reasoning was sound:
Requiring a social host either to control a belligerent guest or to protect her guests
from the threat of injury by another guest would impose a duty 'that is realistically
incapable of performance' in the usual circumstances. For example, it is
unrealistic to expect a social host to accurately anticipate when a guest poses a risk
of serious injury to another guest.

Moreover, wholly apart from the question of whether the proposed duty is feasible,
there remains the key point that a special relationship ordinarily is found only
when there is an element of dependency of the one claiming the duty upon the one
owing the duty that is created by the nature of the relationship between the parties.
But there is nothing inherent in the host-guest relationship that makes a guest
particularly dependent upon the host for protection when threatened by another
guest... We therefore conclude that the host-guest relationship does not give rise
to a special relationship imposing on a social host an affirmative duty either to
9

control or to protect her guests where it is foreseeable that one may injure another.
Gilger, 2000 UT 23 atffl[17-18 (internal citations omitted).
The Utah Supreme Court has declared, "[W]e are loath to recognize a duty that is
realistically incapable of performance or fundamentally at odds with the nature of the
parties' relationship." Higgins, 855 P.2d at 237. It ruled in Gilger that imposing a duty
on a host of a party to control his or her guests is "realistically incapable of
performance...." Gilger 2000 UT 23 at ^f 17. It is equally unrealistic in this case to assign
Eric the responsibility of controlling Walters' behavior. The plaintiff in Gilger was a
guest at the party where there was drinking, making it more foreseeable that the defendant
might come into contact and potentially harm him. Here, Henshaw was not a guest and
there was no reason for Eric to foresee Walters would come into contact with Henshaw.
Moreover, the plaintiff in Gilger was injured on the host's property. Here, Henshaw was
injured away from the cabin where the party occurred.
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court ruled in Gilger that the focal point of imposing
liability under a special relationship is whether the person injured or the person causing
the injury is dependent on the party against whom the duty is sought to be imposed.
There are no facts in the record establishing either Henshaw or Walters were dependent
on Eric in any way. Therefore, there is no basis for imposing a duty on Eric to prevent
Walters from harming Henshaw based solely on the fact Walters was Eric's social guest.
Henshaw cites Cruz v. Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252 (Utah
1996), as support for his argument that Eric had a duty to prevent Walters from using the
10

ATV. Cruz is inapplicable here. The plaintiff in Cruz was struck by a car stolen from the
defendant's lot in which the defendant had left the keys. The plaintiff filed suit against
the car lot alleging it was negligent in leaving the keys in the ignition. Id. at 1253. The
Utah Supreme Court ruled:
[U]nder 'special' or 'unusualy circumstances, a duty may exist where a defendant
should reasonably anticipate that its conduct will create an unreasonably
enhanced danger to one in the position of the injured plaintiff. If such danger is
foreseeable, then a duty arises to exercise reasonable care toward the safety of
others.
Id. at 1255 (emphases added). The touchstone of Cruz is foreseeability.
There are no facts in the record that establish it was reasonably foreseeable that
Walters would drive the ATV at a high rate of speed in the dark while drunk without a
headlight. It defies common sense. Moreover, it is undisputed that Eric specifically told
his friends not to ride the ATV after dark because the headlight was broken and he made
sure before he went to sleep that the ATV was parked and not being used. It was not
foreseeable under these facts that Walters would sneak it out without Eric's permission.
Therefore, there is no basis for imposing liability on Eric for failure to protect Henshaw
from Walters and the Court should affirm summary judgment in his favor.
II.

JOINDER IN ARGUMENTS ASSERTED BY PINE MOUNTAIN
WATER MUTUAL ASSOCIATION.

The Coon Defendants join in the arguments made by Pine Mountain Mutual
Association in their brief, to the extent they apply to the Coon Defendants, and assert
them as a basis for affirming summary judgment in their favor.
11

CONCLUSION
The district court properly concluded that the Coon Defendants owed no duty to
Henshaw to protect him from harm by Walters. Therefore, there is no basis for the
imposition of liability against the Coon Defendants and the Court should affirm the trial
court's entry of summary judgment in their favor and award them their costs.
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
The Coon Defendants join in the request of Henshaw and Pine Mountain Water
Mutual Association for oral argument.
DATED this 1

day of July, 2004.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Heath
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees Lynn,
LuannfendEric uoon
N:\20l38\4\Appeal\Briel.doc
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